Linking Agricultural Development to School Feeding by Sumberg, James & Sabates-Wheeler, Rachel
Working Paper 012 www.future-agricultures.org
Linking Agricultural 
Development to School 
Feeding1 
James Sumberg & Rachel Sabates-Wheeler2, 3 
June 2010
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
Working Paper 012 www.future-agricultures.orgii
Table of Contents
Introduction and background....................................................................................................................................................................1
Scope of the paper..........................................................................................................................................................................................1
Narratives, concepts and models..............................................................................................................................................................1
The “localised procurement” model.........................................................................................................................................................2
The problem with “local” – a small aside......................................................................................................................4
Market engagement, demand-assisted strategies and structured demand...........................................................4
Market engagement.................................................................................................................................................................................4
Demand assisted development strategies......................................................................................................................5
Structured demand.................................................................................................................................................................................6
Multipliers and spill-overs..........................................................................................................................................................................7
Agricultural development benefits......................................................................................................................................................8
Direct benefits...................................................................................................................................................................................8
Indirect benefits...................................................................................................................................................................................8
Critical factors moderating positive benefits......................................................................................................................8
Spatial distribution of actors and benefits........................................................................................................................8
Thresholds and scale effects.......................................................................................................................................................................9
Policy complementarities and sequencing......................................................................................................................11
HGSF procurement models.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................................................................15
Are family farmers analogous to SMEs?......................................................................................................................15
Devolution and structured demand......................................................................................................................15
Delivery mechanisms for supply-side measures......................................................................................................................16
Silver bullets on the school menu......................................................................................................................................................16
Appendix Table 1. Characteristics of procurement systems in pilot countries.......................................................................18
References.......................................................................................................................................................................................................19
3
Working Paper 012 www.future-agricultures.org1
Introduction and 
background
Scope of the paper
This paper is an output from the initial phase of the 
Home-Grown School Feeding (HGSF) Project which is 
funded by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and 
implemented by the Partnership for Child Development 
at Imperial College.  The Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS) at the University of Sussex is a project partner and 
part of the project’s agricultural technical consortium. 
As such IDS is charged with providing expertise across 
three areas: agricultural development, food security and 
social protection.  IDS also play a central role in the evalu-
ation component of the project.
Over the last five years HGSF – essentially an attempt 
to actively and explicitly link agricultural development 
with school feeding – has received increasing attention 
from international agencies (Sanchez et al. 2005), policy 
makers (e.g. CAADP4), national governments, academics 
(Morgan et al. 2007) and practitioners (Espejo et al. 2009). 
BMGF has funded or co-funded some of these activities 
as well as other closely related initiatives such as WFP’s 
Purchase-for-Progress (P4P) programme.5
The rise of interest in HGSF in many ways parallels and 
even reflects the recent convergence in policy debates 
between agricultural and social protection policies, espe-
cially in Africa.  This interlinking of “social” and “economic” 
policies for poor farmers was anticipated by earlier 
debates in the 1990s around “linking relief and develop-
ment” and “productivity-enhancing safety nets”.  However 
this link has been sharpened by the “colonisation” by 
social protection of many traditional agricultural policy 
instruments, including innovative approaches to crop 
insurance, agricultural input subsidies and even grain 
futures markets.  The conventional view – that agricultural 
policies promote growth in yields and incomes, while 
social protection stabilises yields and consumption 
(when production fails) – is being challenged by emerging 
evidence that both objectives can be achieved, over 
specific populations, in a single instrument (Dorward et 
al. 2006; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2009).  The evidence base 
for these positive synergies is limited but growing, and 
in many ways this paper charts the territory for investi-
gating whether and under what conditions these syner-
gies exist for HGSF.
The objective of this working paper is to explore the 
links between school feeding and agricultural develop-
ment that are at the heart of HGSF.  In particular we want 
to interrogate the “home-grown” element of HGSF from 
first principles.  What are the narratives, concepts, models 
and experiences that inform the HGSF proposition, 
particularly as it relates to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)?  This 
paper has a specific focus on the notion of “structured 
demand” or “demand-assisted growth” and the ways it 
can be manifest through different procurement systems. 
We do not review the global experience with school 
feeding in general or HGSF in particular as this has been 
done by others (Morgan et al. 2007;  Espejo et al. 
2009).
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we 
explore relevant narratives, concepts and models, 
focusing particularly on the “localised procurement” 
model, structured demand, strategic complementarities 
and multipliers.  Following this we explore how direct 
and indirect benefits might arise through “demand 
assisted agricultural growth” linked to school feeding. 
The next section presents a preliminary discussion of 
some selected HGSF procurement models.  The final 
section presents conclusions and suggestions for further 
work.
Narratives, concepts and 
models
HGSF has been defined in a variety of ways, e.g.:
Espejo et al. (2009) in Home-Grown School Feeding: A 
Framework to Link School Feeding with Local Agricultural 
Production suggest that HGSF is:
“In the broadest sense… a school feeding 
programme that provides food produced and 
purchased within a country to the extent 
possible.” 
“… linking school feeding programmes with local 
small-scale farmer production by creating an 
ongoing market  for  smal l  landholders 
(“smallholders”).”
“… a school feeding programme that offers food 
produced and purchased within a country.”
Morgan et al. (2007) in Home Grown: The New Era of 
School Feeding suggest that HGSF is:
“… a new model of school feeding that is designed 
to deliver agricultural/market improvements as well 
as nutritional and educational benefits”
“…a novel approach to school feeding that simul-
taneously addresses nutritional, educational, agri-
cultural/market improvements in ways that create 
new and innovative synergies to deliver broader 
development outcomes”
CAADP, in its description of Pillar 3 (Food supply and 
hunger) (http://www.nepad-caadp.net/pillar-3.php), 
describe HGSF as:
“… designed to link school feeding to agricultural 
development through the purchase and use of 
locally and domestically produced food”
The common element that links these various defini-
tions is the idea that HGSF is an attempt to actively and 
explicitly link agricultural development with school feed-
ing.6 There is less agreement in relation to the scale at 
which this linkage might take place (“local”; “within a 
country”; “domestically produced”) and the nature of the 
linkage mechanisms is seldom specified.  As indicated 
in the introduction, HGSF seeks to deliver simultaneously 
on economic growth and social protection / poverty 
reduction objectives.  As such it brings together very 
different agendas that are at times contradictory and in 
tension with each other.  As we will see in a later section 
these tensions show up at the procurement and produc-
tion level in terms e.g. of trade-offs between profit for 
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entrepreneurs and adequate provision of food for vulner-
able groups.
The story or narrative that is commonly used to explain 
and justify the interest in HGSF has three parts as 
follows:
The agricultural sector and the livelihoods of small- •
scale farmers in SSA can be transformed for the better 
primarily through greater engagement with 
markets.
However, this transformational potential is presently  •
constrained by the failure of input and output markets, 
poor infrastructure and sub-optimal use of produc-
tivity enhancing technology.
But, by “structuring” demand in ways that make it  •
easier, less risky and more profitable for small-scale 
farmers to engage with markets, and by providing an 
array of complimentary services (training, credit, access 
to technology), school feeding programmes can be 
used to kick start this market-based transformational 
process.
This narrative can be reduced to a deceivingly simple 
argument: the livelihoods of poor, smallholder farmers 
in SSA will be transformed primarily through further 
integration with markets, and intervention is needed to 
get this process started.  This is actually a much more 
complex, multi-step argument; with some of the steps 
being hotly contested (Table 1).
As reflected in the narrative, much of the HGSF litera-
ture refers to “small farmers” and “smallholders”; yet, here 
as in so many other situations, names and labels matter. 
When it comes to how to refer to millions of people in 
sub-Saharan Africa who produce crops and livestock 
products, the choice is very wide indeed (Table 2).  Each 
of these labels draws attention to some specific 
characteristic(s) of the lives or production systems of 
African “farmers”, or of the economic and political rela-
tions within which they farm.  However, each label is 
partial, and many are poorly defined and arbitrary.  In 
addition, with increasingly diversified rural livelihoods 
(Ellis 2000; Bryceson 2002), blurred boundaries between 
“cash” and “food” crops, and the plethora of channels 
through which land is accessed, the value of many of the 
labels in the table must be questioned.
Therefore, following Sumberg (2006), in the remainder 
of this report we will use the terms “family farmers”, 
“family farm” and “family farming” to refer to the highly 
heterogeneous population of rural people whose liveli-
hoods depend to some degree on farming and who 
pursue their farming primarily with their own and/or their 
family’s labour.
The “localised procurement” model
In addition to links with the argument about agricultural 
growth and poverty reduction laid-out above it is possible 
to situate the growing interest in HGSF in relation to 
contemporary academic and policy debates (and 
increasing activism) around public procurement and 
localisation.  The notion that public sector procurement 
can serve as a powerful tool to advance economic devel-
opment (e.g. through small enterprise development) is 
well established – Tendler and Amorim (1996) describe 
this approach in terms of “demand-assisted growth”. 
More recently, the role of public procurement in 
promoting sustainability, environmental and social 
agendas has been highlighted in both the North (e.g. 
Eckersley 2004; McCrudden 2004) and the South (Bolton 
2008; Geng and Doberstein 2008).  The basic idea is that 
the immense purchasing power of the state can be used 
Table 1. The argument behind the HGSF narrative.
Step Notes / comments / references
Agricultural growth is essential for 1. 
broad-based poverty reduction in SSA.
See e.g. Delgado and Hopkins (1998); Irz et al. (2001) and Thirtle 
et al. (2003); cf. Söderbom and Teal (2003).7
Agricultural growth will come about 2. 
through increased engagement with 
input & output markets, which will be 
associated with technical change & 
productivity enhancement.
See e.g. Dorward et al. (2004).
In SSA the greatest poverty reduction 3. 
impact of this “market engagement 
– agricultural growth – poverty reduc-
tion” linkage will come via a focus on 
small farms.8 
See e.g. Lipton (2009) and Wiggins (2009); cf. Collier (2008; 2009).9
A more ideological restatement of Steps 1-3 might be: the 
agricultural sector & the livelihoods of small-scale farmers in SSA 
can be transformed for the better only through greater engage-
ment with markets.
A major block to greater market 4. 
engagement is the fact that in much of 
rural SSA input and output markets are 
“thin”, seasonal and poorly governed; 
infrastructure is poor etc.
See e.g. Poulton et al. (2006) and Barrett (2008). 
The demand for food can be “structured” 5. 
so that it is [easier, less costly, less risky] 
for specific target groups (e.g. the 
smaller-scale producers or poorer 
producers) within the population of 
“small farmers” to increase their level of 
commercialisation.
By “structured demand” we mean:
A public, demand-side market intervention  •
That seeks to reduce barriers to entry &/or transactions costs for  •
the purpose of bringing specific groups into the market
And that may involve other longer-term, less-direct interventions  •
e.g. transportation or policy
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in a pro-active, innovative manner to favour different 
suppliers, regions and products – and ultimately trans-
form outcomes – compared to more standard “least cost” 
or “value for money” approaches.  
The particular example of procurement of food for 
schools has been explored in some detail (Morgan 2008; 
Morgan and Sonnino 2008; Sonnino 2009).  The move-
ment toward in-country (or regional) procurement of 
food aid can also be seen in the light of new 
understandings of the range of benefits (i.e. to farmers, 
traders, transporters and food aid beneficiaries) that can 
be derived from alternative and more localised public 
procurement strategies (Maxwell 2007).
One of the unanticipated consequences of the era of 
globalisation has been the rise of interest in the “the local” 
and processes of economic localisation [for an analysis 
of this dynamic in relation to food see Hinrichs (2003)]. 
Indeed, some have suggested that efforts to localise (or 
Table 2.  Naming farmers in Africa
Aspect or characteristic of farmer or farming activity Common labels
Scale Small-scale farmer •
Large-scale farmer •
Objective Subsistence farmer •
Semi-subsistence farmer •
Commercial farmer •
Level of engagement; importance within livelihood Full-time farmer •
Part-time farmer •
Origin or level of inputs used Family farmer •
Low-external-input farmer •
Mechanised farmer •
Viability Resource-poor farmer •
Marginal farmer •
Political economy within which farming takes place Peasant farmer •
Small-holder farmer •
Capitalist farmer •
Adapted from: Sumberg (2006)
The provision of complimentary services (training, credit, 6. 
access to inputs & technology) can be linked to the process 
of structuring demand.
The cotton sector in some parts of SSA provides 
good examples of successful provision of services 
by produce buying agencies (see Tschirley et al. 
2010).
More generally see Tendler and Amorim (1996) on 
the provision of complimentary services to SMEs in 
as part of “demand-assisted growth” strategies.
Procurement of food for publically-funded school feeding 7. 
is in the frame for two reasons:
There is growing recognition among both funders and a. 
recipient countries of the benefits of substituting 
domestically produced commodities for food aid & 
imported commodities;
Because demand is predictable it is seen to provide an b. 
opportunity to structure demand for a significant quan-
tity of domestically produced food in a way that will 
stimulate greater market engagement by targeted 
groups of small farmers.
See e.g. Maxwell (2007)
See Espejo et al.  & Morgan et al. (2007)
Thus, the use of structured demand to supply school 8. 
feeding programmes is an obvious avenue that can and 
should be used to kick start a sustainable process of rural 
poverty reduction & livelihood transformation.
CAADP Pillar III Framework for African Food Security 
(FAFS)10 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Agricultural 
Development Strategy Overview11
Table 1. (cont)
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re-localise) economic activity could or should be the 
centre-piece of area development or regeneration 
programmes addressing issues such as unemployment, 
inequality and vulnerability to climate change.  Thinking 
along these lines is also central to the “food sovereignty” 
agenda and its alternative vision for agriculture and rural 
development worldwide (Martinez-Torres and Rosset 
2010).  In the UK, the image of a “local” economy as a 
leaky bucket has been widely used to illustrate the 
benefits of localisation.  The idea is that localisation can 
be seen as a process of “plugging the leaks” (i.e. reducing 
the outflow of money from the “local” area) (Ward and 
Lewis 2002); and it is argued that poor and disadvantaged 
people stand to benefit from enhanced money flows 
through the multiplier effect (see below).  Over the last 
decade the social, economic and environmental implica-
tions of the localisation of food and food systems have 
received particular attention (Winter 2003; Hinrichs 2003; 
DuPuis and Goodman 2005; Born and Purcell 2006).12  
The HGSF proposition combines elements from both 
the public procurement and localisation debates (Figure 
1).  This model proposes that public sector can be used 
to stimulate a “local” supply response which in turn (e.g. 
though the new wages pumped into the economy) 
creates new demand for “local” goods and services.  In 
theory, as this cycle begins to turn it becomes increas-
ingly self-sustaining.
A number of commentators have already noted that 
if not handled carefully, the process of establishing this 
virtuous cycle through HGSF could potentially result in 
negative impacts.  For example, if a programme’s demand 
for food is large relative to the size of the “local” market, 
and there is no immediate supply response, prices could 
be driven up with negative consequences for poor people 
who rely on the same market for food provisioning 
[Stoppa (2007) modelled several scenarios along these 
lines].  One obvious conclusion is that context and scale 
considerations must figure prominently in programme 
design.
The problem with “local” – a small aside
The word local is central to discussions of HGSF.  This 
point is illustrated by two key documents: in Home 
Grown: The New Era of School Feeding (Morgan et al. 
2007) local appears 838 times (in 477 pages), while in 
Home-Grown School Feeding: A Framework to Link 
School Feeding with Local Agricultural Production 
(Espejo et al. 2009) it appears 124 times (in 80 pages). 
However neither document spells out clearly what is 
meant by local.  Rather, depending on the context it is 
used to refer to e.g. within the boundary of the village(s) 
surrounding a single school, or at the other extreme, to 
within the national boundary of the country within which 
the same school sits.  For a word that is so central, this 
level of ambiguity, and the resulting confusion, is 
untenable.
Literature and practice relating to food systems point 
to a number of different approaches to defining local:
Administrative  • – with local being defined as within 
the boundaries of an administrative unit such as a 
nation, a specific region, district or village.  This 
approach results in unacceptable anomalies when, for 
example, the administrative unit is very large (e.g. 
cowpeas grown in northern Nigeria considered “local” 
to Lagos; or avocados from California considered “local” 
to New York) or very small; or a settlement of interest 
is located near the boundary of two contiguous admin-
istrative units.  
Spatial •  – with local being defined as within a set 
distance (e.g. 10, 50 or 100 km) from a settlement of 
interest.  This approach is essentially arbitrary, taking 
no account of different size settlements, population 
densities, agro-ecological conditions and so on.
Environmental  • – with local being defined in relation 
to the spatial pattern of carbon emissions (Plassmann 
and Edwards-Jones 2009).  
Aspirational •  – with local being defined on a sliding 
scale from the village to the nation, with the objective 
to purchase “as local as possible”.  To some degree this 
reflects the current situation with HGSF, but it provides 
a very poor basis for analysis and evaluation.
Participatory •  – with local being defined in each situ-
ation by “the people” themselves.
Each of these approaches has either serious concep-
tual and/or operational limitations.  There seems to be 
some momentum within the HGSF community around 
the idea that at a minimum “local” production could be 
interpreted as “domestic” production (i.e. from within the 
national boundary).  However this suggests a meaning 
of “local” that is neither intuitive nor anywhere close to 
common usage.  
We conclude from this that for the sake of clarity in 
relation to HGSF, except in those situations where the 
intended meaning is unambiguous, it will be best to avoid 
the word local altogether.  We follow this convention in 
the remainder of this report.
Market engagement, demand-assisted 
strategies and structured demand
Market engagement
In theory the long-term objectives of HGSF (i.e. social 
protection plus transformed livelihoods for poor “small-
holder farmers”) are to be achieved primarily through 
Figure 1. The “localised public procurement” model
Public
procurement
Economic
localisation
Increases “local”
demand for “local”
goods & services
+
Stimulates “local”
economic activity
(e.g. supply)
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increased market participation, which should in turn 
drive investment in productivity enhancing agricultural 
technology.  The conventional wisdom is that in much 
of rural SSA this positive link between market engage-
ment and investment in technology fails to materialise 
because agricultural input and output markets are 
“thin”13, supporting institutions (e.g. providing research, 
extension and credit) are “weak” and many rural areas 
are poorly served by transportation and communications 
infrastructure.  In other words, increased market engage-
ment is constrained by a number of inter-related factors, 
some of which reflect fundamental geographical, polit-
ical and economic relations.  Under these circumstances, 
Barrett (2008, p.300)  suggests that “One thus has to get 
institutions and endowments, as well as prices, ‘right’ in 
order to induce market-based development”.  
More recently, social entrepreneurs (many funded and 
supported by BMGF) have identified not just “missing” 
markets, but lack of information and appropriate tech-
nology as the fundamental constraints to releasing entre-
preneurial spirit at a mass level in Africa.  The vision is 
then to provide the incentive for “latent entrepreneurs” 
to blossom: here the vehicle for poverty reduction on a 
large scale is to promote and create an entrepreneurial 
middle class in Africa.  Central to this vision is the willing-
ness of an external agency to underwrite (or subsidise) 
risk in the initial stages of growth and expansion.
Another closely related way to understand limited 
market engagement of smallholder farmers in SSA is 
through the lens of coordination risk.  Dorward and Kydd 
(2004) define economic coordination risk as “the risk of 
failure of one player’s investment due to the possible 
absence of complementary investments by other players 
in different stages in the supply chain.”  Coordination risk 
is particularly prevalent where there are thin markets 
and weak institutions, as in much of rural Africa.
Poulton et al. (2004) describe coordination within 
agricultural markets as “effort or measures designed to 
make players within a market system act in a common 
or complementary way or toward a common goal”, and 
suggest that coordination “may be undertaken by private 
agents acting collectively or may be orchestrated by state 
agents defining the boundaries within which private 
agents can act.”  
From the perspective of those interested in pro-poor 
agricultural development in SSA, “the central coordina-
tion challenge… is… how to develop supply chain 
systems that provide smallholders with access to the 
range of pre-harvest services that they require at the 
same time as enhancing their access to remunerative 
output market opportunities” (Dorward et al. 2005).  “This 
requires non-market coordination (sometimes, but not 
necessarily, led by the state) to deal with risks that inhibit 
complementary and mutually dependent investments 
along a supply chain, where these investments are held 
back by thin markets and by high costs in controlling 
opportunism (e.g. in produce grading and in seasonal 
finance)” (Dorward et al. 2005).
Some examples of the use of non-market coordination 
mechanisms in smallholder agriculture in SSA include: 
contract farming (Little and Watts 1994; Porter and 
PhillipsHoward 1997; Minten et al. 2009); the cotton 
sector (Poulton et al. 2004; Tschirley et al. 2010); and the 
export horticulture sector (Dolan and Humphrey 2000). 
In most of these cases coordination includes (but is not 
limited to) the guaranteed markets and prices, the provi-
sion of some production inputs (e.g. seeds and fertiliser) 
on credit and technical assistance.  Examples of state-led 
non-market coordination include the now largely aban-
doned use of grain marketing boards.
Demand assisted development strategies
For at least some proponents of HGSF increased market 
participation is closely tied to the notion of “structured 
demand” (see next section).  While this term is relatively 
new it has a long intellectual and policy pedigree, and 
probably links most directly to ideas and experience 
around “small-enterprise favouring procurement”, 
“demand-driven models” and “demand-assisted [small 
enterprise] growth” (Tendler and Amorim 1996).  These 
are in contrast to “supply-driven approaches” which 
“specialize in providing one or more ongoing services 
- credit, courses in business management, or technical 
assistance. They try to serve as many firms and as many 
sectors as possible” (Tendler and Amorim 1996).  These 
two approaches are not unrelated – clearly the ambition 
of a demand-assisted approach is to stimulate a supply-
side response – but the critical question is which side 
(demand or supply) drives the intervention.  To the extent 
that the supply side is constrained through the coordina-
tion failures referred to above there may be a need to 
provide complementary services (training, technical 
assistance) to allow a demand-side response to 
develop.
Tendler and Amorim drew a number of lessons from 
their study “demand-assisted SE [small enterprise] 
growth” initiatives to promote SMEs in northeast Brazil. 
These include that:
“purchasing units should not be required to buy from  •
small firms” (emphasis in original)
“the SE support functions be kept separate from the  •
purchasing function, so that the support agency – 
together with the firms – will have to prove to the 
purchasing unit the SE products can be delivered at 
the same price and quality as that of the government’s 
existing suppliers”
“SE-favouring procurement should contract only with  •
groups of firms, and pay each producer only upon 
delivery and satisfactory inspection of the product of 
the whole group”
“SE-favouring procurement must make a substantial  •
part of the payment to suppliers up front – in our case, 
50%”
“the support agency must earn a small commission  •
on the contract”
To reiterate: the idea is not a strategy of positive 
discrimination that favours small firms at the expense of 
large ones, but rather a strategy that helps the small firms 
compete with other providers in term of both quality 
and price.  Tendler and Amorim stress that one critical 
element of such a strategy is working through an associa-
tion of firms because it allows peer monitoring, shared 
information and learning, quality control, group purchase, 
skills upgrading and backward and forward linkages. 
These important advantages can only be gained if the 
firms are in close proximity (this links directly to both the 
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extensive discussion of “enterprise clusters” in the SME 
literature and common strategies in the micro-finance 
sector).  Close proximity is required if customised assis-
tance is to be given in an efficient way to firms that are 
producing to the same contract, allowing “the support 
agency … to link the organizing [of firms], and the service 
that goes with it, to a contract and the problems that 
arise in meeting it” (p.422).
Structured demand
Drawing on these earlier experiences and linking them 
to the current interest in the use of “structured markets” 
as a component of HGSF (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
2008, 2009) we suggest that structured demand can be 
conceived of as public, demand-side market interven-
tions that have the explicit objective of reducing barriers 
to entry and/or transactions costs faced by specific 
groups of potential suppliers.  In relation to food, these 
demand-side interventions:
Seek to create significant additional demand • 14 that is 
predictable over time; often by supplying programmes 
that use food as a form of social protection (e.g. school 
feeding…)
May be accompanied by supply-side measures (e.g.  •
access to information, new technology, credit, training 
etc)
Are ultimately based on the proposition that greater  •
market integration of target groups (e.g. small-scale 
agricultural producers in SSA) will result in significant 
income benefits and support long-term livelihood 
transformation
The areas of direct intervention that might be used 
to “structure” demand so as to encourage or facilitate 
engagement by small-scale producers include the speci-
fication of:
The type and intrinsic qualities of the commodities to  •
be purchased
Any extrinsic qualities of the commodities (e.g. type  •
of producer or geographical area of production)
The quantity to be purchased (e.g. number of lots,  •
minimum lot size) over what time period and delivery 
requirements (e.g. place, quantity, frequency)
The mechanism for determining price •
Figure 2. “Structured market” required to make the “localised public procurement” model deliver targeted 
benefits
Public
procurement
Economic
localisation
Increases “local” demand for
“local” goods & services
+
Stimulates “local”
economic activity (e.g.
supply)
Structured demand
Benefits to
specified
“target”
groups
Benefits to
specified
“target”
groups
Figure 3. Direct and indirect benefits arising from 
the “localised public procurement” model15
Strategic use of public procurement
  = “Demand-driven assistance” 
  = “Structured demand”
Direct benefits
  - to producers
  - to other market actors
Indirect benefits
  - via spillover effects
  - via strategic complementarities
  - via multiplier effects
Results in
Which give rise to
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Any minimum requirements to become a “registered”  •
or “licensed” supplier; any other restrictions on who 
can tender 
Contract details (e.g. mode and frequency of payment,  •
upfront payments, default penalties, insurance 
requirements…)
Beyond these, other longer-term, less-direct interven-
tions may be required (e.g. in relation to transportation 
and policy).
We can now return to the localised public procurement 
model.  In Figure 2 we have added a box for structured 
demand, which represents, in effect, the way that the 
public procurement and localisation elements are opera-
tionalised.  Seen from another angle, structured demand 
is simply a public-sector coordination mechanism.  In 
Figure 2 we have also made explicit that the goal is to 
direct the benefits to specified target groups (i.e. family 
farmers) as opposed to simply increasing the aggregate 
level of economic activity.
Multipliers and spill-overs
Figure 2 above provides a heuristic device that enables 
us to identify some testable hypotheses. In particular we 
are interested to establish whether and to what extent 
the structured demand model can provide the “spin-offs” 
to specified target groups as well as the stimulus to a 
“local” dynamism whereby demand and supply synergise 
to provide long term agricultural development.  
When considering the impacts arising from a develop-
ment intervention, it is common to divide these into 
direct and indirect impacts (Figure 3).  The direct impacts 
are association with planned expenditure.  In the case 
of HGSF, these direct effects arise from expenditure for 
the purchase of food resulting in an increased level of 
demand and additional marketing and income oppor-
tunities for food producers and suppliers.  We will look 
at these direct impacts in more detail in a later section.
In exploring the indirect impacts associated with the 
creation of linkages between school feeding and agri-
cultural development we make use of the literature on 
local economy effects.  The view that providing support 
to communities affected by liquidity or credit constraints 
(in the form of development aid, cash transfers or other 
farm level support) could act to stimulate the local 
economy has a long tradition in economics.  It reflects 
canonical views about the working of multipliers, say 
from Keynesian models which focus on the effects 
produced by agent interactions.  A classic article by 
Cooper and John (1988) distinguishes between three 
different types of effects.  Spill-overs occur where the 
actions of some agents confer external benefits on their 
neighbours.  Typically, this is the example of a flower 
farmer who benefits from the nearby bee keeper.  Spill-
overs can be positive (e.g. learning, technology transfer 
and social capital formation) or negative (e.g. pollution). 
Strategic complementarities on the other hand refer to 
the possibility that the strategy followed by one agent 
increases the optimal strategies of others.  For example, 
road or irrigation improvements made by one farmer 
might enable an improved allocation of productive 
resources by her neighbours.  Finally, there are 
multipliers. 
Kay (2002) suggests that an economic multiplier is “a 
number used to estimate economy-wide [or region-wide] 
impacts of industry-specific economic changes”.  The 
greater the linkages between the industry or sector of 
interest and the rest of the economy the larger the multi-
plier; and, the greater the multiplier, the greater the 
economy-wide or employment impact of a given stim-
ulus to one industry or sector of the economy.  When 
linkages are limited (as indicated by low levels of “local” 
spending) there is said to be a high degree of “leakage”, 
and thus fewer positive indirect impacts on the “local” 
area of interest.  The problem of leakage accounts for 
the general observation that there is a positive 
Table 3. Potential direct agricultural development benefits associated with HGSF
Benefit Beneficiaries Size of benefit dependent on:
Increased demand for commod-
ities already being produced
Producers
&/or
other supply chain actors
The net additional demand represented by HGSF 
purchases
Supply response
Functioning of existing market mechanism(s)
New marketing channel for 
commodities already being 
produced
Producers
&/or
other supply chain actors
Functioning of new market / procurement 
mechanism
Marketing channel for new 
commodities
Producers
&/or
other supply chain actors
Level of demand for new product
Supply response 
Functioning of new market / procurement 
mechanism
Reduction in risk & income 
uncertainty
Producers
&/or
other supply chain actors
Proportion of marketed produce represented by 
HGSF purchases
Functioning of new markets / procurement 
mechanisms
Improved access to training, 
credit, technology…
Producers
&/or
other supply chain actors
Terms governing access
Effectiveness of goods / services in enhancing 
productivity
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correlation between the size of the area being considered 
and the size of the multiplier.  Kay highlights the fact that 
in principle multipliers allow the analyst to capture both 
the direct and indirect effects effect of an intervention. 
This literature on local economy effects is critical to 
understanding the pathways (and constraints) by which 
structured demand and thereby HGSF, is able to effect 
broader agricultural change and transformation.  We 
identify some of these pathways and the mechanisms 
for local economy effects below.
Agricultural development benefits
Here we return to the discussion of possible direct and 
indirect agriculture and rural development benefits asso-
ciated with HGSF.  As the ultimately objective has been 
framed in terms of livelihood transformation, the concern 
has to be with the nature, magnitude, time-scale, and 
perhaps most importantly, the distribution of these 
benefits.
Direct benefits
A number of direct agricultural benefits that might be 
associated with HGSF can be identified (Table 3). 
Depending on the procurement model these might 
accrue to either producers or to other supply chain actors. 
The magnitude and distribution of these benefits will 
depend on how much food is purchased, the objectives 
and effectiveness of any targeting strategy, and where, 
how and how effectively the purchases are made (i.e. 
the procurement model and how effectively it is 
implemented).
The spatial distribution of these direct benefits (e.g. 
in relation to the schools being supplied) will depend 
on the procurement model and how effectively it is 
implemented.
Indirect benefits
The indirect benefits of an intervention such as HGSF 
will be many, more widely distributed, develop over a 
longer time frame… and some are likely to be unintended 
and unforeseen. Nevertheless, a number of indirect 
benefits that might be associated with HGSF can be 
identified (Table 4).
Critical factors moderating positive 
benefits
In the preceding section we identified routes, both direct 
and indirect, by which benefits may arise through the 
“localised public procurement” model when applied to 
school feeding.  These routes are further mediated by a 
number of factors, and in the sections below we consider 
four of these.
Spatial distribution of actors and benefits
So far in this paper spatial relationships have been high-
lighted in the discussion of localised public procurement, 
the ambiguity around “local” and the advantage of 
Table 4. Potential indirect benefits associated with HGSF
Benefit Beneficiaries Mechanism Benefit dependent on
Additional jobs / wages People seeking jobs / 
wages
Multiplier Quantities of commodities purchased  •
by HGSF
Marginal labour requirements (e.g.  •
by commodity & production 
system)
Consumption preferences •
Increased demand for 
food
Producers & other food 
chain actors
Multiplier Level of additional wages •
Consumption preferences •
Increased demand for 
non-food goods & 
services
Providers of non-food 
goods & services
Multiplier Level of additional wages •
Consumption preferences •
Increased variety of 
commodities available 
in market
Consumers Spill-over HGSF creating demand for & stimu-
lating surplus production of  
commodities not normally grown in 
area
Lower food prices Consumers Spill-over Supply response via more land being 
cultivated or investment in tech-
nology (Stoppa 2007)
Technical learning Producers
Other food chain actors
Spill-over Availability of appropriate & effective  •
technical assistance
Correct incentives being in place •
Social capital 
formation
Producers
Other food chain actors
Spill-over Correct incentives being in place
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working with firms that are in close proximity.  In this 
section we explore the spatial relations around HGSF 
further.  Ultimately we are interested in understanding 
how different approaches to structuring demand, and 
the procurement models that result from these, affect 
the spatial distribution of benefit arising from HGSF, 
which brings us back to the whole question of 
targeting.
We can identify two potential spatial variables that 
might be important in relation to the level, type and/or 
distribution of benefits arising from HGSF.  These are:
The degree to which producers are clustered (e.g. clus- •
tered / not clustered)16
The proximity of producers to point of consumption  •
(e.g. nearby / distant)
Combining these we have three meaningful spatial 
configurations (Figure 4):
Producers clustered; consumers nearby: e.g. a very  •
decentralised model of school-level procurement 
primarily from nearby producers;
Producers clustered; consumers distant: e.g. a more  •
centralised model where food is procured from clus-
tered farmers in food surplus areas and shipped to 
distant schools;
Producers not clustered: e.g. a centralised model where  •
food is procured with no specification of origin and 
shipped to distant schools.
Configuration 1 implies a very close link between the 
sites of production and consumption, which might be 
important in meeting “local” taste or quality preferences, 
in supplying very isolated schools or in supplying fresh 
or perishable produce.  Configurations 1 and 2 allow for 
the clustering of producers as highlighted by Tendler 
and Amorim, and thus open the way for “peer monitoring, 
shared information and learning, quality control, group 
purchase, skills upgrading and backward and forward 
linkages”.  Configuration 2 and 3 imply more centralised 
procurement systems operating at larger scales and 
handling greater quantities, and imply an important 
intermediary role for intermediaries in the supply chain. 
Configuration 3 gives the greatest room to manoeuvre 
in terms of choice, quality, price etc. but would make the 
provision of accompanying supply-side measures both 
difficult and expensive.
With these configurations in mind we can return to 
the potential direct and indirect benefits of HGSF identi-
fied in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.  In Table 5 we 
make a preliminary assessment of which of the spatial 
configurations will likely be associated with relatively 
high levels of each potential direct and indirect 
benefit. 
Thresholds and scale effects
As noted above the vision for HGSF is to help transform 
family farming and rural livelihoods.  In order to under-
stand the potential of HGSF to achieve this vision the 
concepts and empirics of thresholds and scale effects 
must be considered.  Suppose, for instance, that we 
choose a highly decentralised HGSF model such that the 
focus is on a community of 100 farm households and a 
school for the children living in those households.  It is 
obvious that even with such a focus there are multiple 
ways to achieve (or not!) a “local” aggregate growth effect. 
For example, we could design a restrictive procurement 
policy and system such that only a small sub-set of the 
100 farmers were able to supply to the HGSF market. 
These, let’s say 10 household may be targeted because 
they meet specific poverty criteria.
P
P
P
PP
P P
P
C
P
P
P
PP
P P
P
CP
P = School food producer
C = School food consumers
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
C
1
2
3
Figure 4. HGSF actors: spatial configurations
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However, is it then realistic to expect an aggregate 
level effect?  The answer to this will depend on, among 
other things, (1) the scale of demand; (2) the ability of 
the targeted households to respond to that demand; 
and (3) the nature of the linkages between the producer 
households and the rest of the local economy.  Thus the 
scale in terms of both coverage and size of demand will 
be vital in producing aggregate level local economy 
effects.  Furthermore, at the aggregate level we need to 
factor in the quantity of food procured for school feeding 
in relation to the total demand for food in the economy. 
Will the demand specific to the school feeding programme 
be able to promote positive aggregate effects if it repre-
sents a very small proportion of the total demand for 
food?  If not, is it then appropriate to expect HGSF to 
deliver on larger agricultural development objectives?
HGSF seeks to achieve market development and social 
protection objectives in one instrument, and because 
of this in many situations it will be necessary to undertake 
complimentary activities to enable poorer farmers to 
increase their engagement with markets.  This is likely 
to require the programme (or an associated agency) 
subsidising training, provision of technology “starter 
packs” and complementary inputs and credit.  In many 
ways this can be viewed as “protectionism” – i.e. shielding 
family farmers from full force of the market while they 
obtain some market advantage.  This protectionism 
implicitly recognises that many poorer family farmers 
face initial thresholds (in assets, training, income, etc), 
below which they are unable to compete and produce 
in a market environment.  If it is to have the desired effects 
the HGSF model must attempt to kick-start these house-
holds by pushing them over these thresholds.
However, vulnerability often arises because farm 
households are constrained by multiple thresholds. 
Thresholds imply nonlinear effects, such that livelihoods 
are particularly sensitive or vulnerable to changes over 
particular ranges of certain variables.  Three thresholds 
illuminate possible synergies and conflicts between 
agricultural and social protection policies.  As well as the 
asset thresholds (Carter and Barrett 2007) just mentioned 
where certain combinations or numbers of assets are 
needed to engage in certain livelihood activities (e.g. 
two oxen for ploughing), there are price thresholds and 
market thresholds. Price thresholds occur where certain 
activities only become worthwhile above a particular 
price.  Market thresholds occur where low volumes and 
numbers of market players lead to high coordination 
Table 5. Spatial distribution of benefits associated with HGSF
Benefit Spatial configuration(s) & other factors associated with relatively high 
levels of the benefit
Direct: Increased demand for commodities 
already being produced
Producers being in close proximity with high level of demand [2]
Direct: New marketing channel for 
commodities already being produced
Producers being in close proximity with level of high demand [2]
Direct: New marketing channel for new 
commodities
Producers being in close proximity [1 & 2]
Direct: Improved access to training, credit, 
technology…
Producers being in close proximity [1 & 2]
Indirect: Additional jobs / wages Producers being in close proximity [1 & 2]; high level of demand [2 
& 3]
Indirect: Increased demand for food Producers being in close proximity [1 & 2]; high level of demand [2 
& 3]; consumption preference for “locally” produced food
Indirect: Increased demand for non-food 
goods & services
Producers being in close proximity [1 & 2]; high level of demand [2 
& 3]; consumption preference for “locally” producer or supplied non-
food goods & services 
Indirect: Increased variety of commodities 
available in market
Producers being in close proximity [1 & 2]
Indirect: Lower food prices Producers being in close proximity [1 & 2]
Indirect: Technical learning Producers &/or suppliers being in close proximity 
[1 & 2]
Indirect: Social capital formation Producers &/or suppliers being in close proximity 
[1 & 2]
[NB: the numbers in brackets refer to the configurations shown in Figure 4]
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risks and transaction costs.  This sets up a vicious circle 
involving low levels of economic activity with few market 
players and low market volumes, high transport and 
communication costs, high transaction risks and costs, 
weak contractual enforcement institutions, high physical 
and market risks, and supply chain investment disincen-
tives and failures (Dorward and Kydd 2005).  All of these 
constraints on rural livelihoods reinforce the argument 
made earlier in this paper, that there is a logical conver-
gence between agricultural policy and social protection 
policy – interventions in assets, prices or markets could 
benefit both agricultural production and household food 
security.  In other words, it is not enough just to intervene 
on assets, or prices or markets alone.  These are important 
considerations for any HGSF programme.
Policy complementarities and sequencing
Building on their development coordination hypothesis 
and drawing on experience from Malawi, Dorward and 
Kydd (2005) argue that input, output and financial 
markets are very thin for goods and services in many 
family farming areas, due to the lack of a well-developed 
and diversified monetary economy, the crisis in commer-
cial agriculture, limited migrant labour opportunities and 
alternative avenues for diversification, weak services and 
communications infrastructure, and low levels of educa-
tion, literacy and farmers’ organisation.  Moreover, trading 
costs are high, information services are costly and there 
is a high risk of transaction failures for buyers and sellers. 
To cover these imperfections and risks, prices are high 
which depresses demand.  The effect of these conditions 
as well as the risks associated with variable prices and 
yields is to trap different players in the supply chains into 
low-level equilibrium activities and perpetuate 
widespread market failure. “Specific supply chains 
needed for rural people to intensify farm production or 
to start adequately capitalized non-farm enterprises tend 
to be absent or very weak” (Dorward and Kydd 2005, 
p.262).
Dorward et al. (2006) note that where markets are thin 
in poor rural economies, market-based approaches to 
food security will not work – as demonstrated by Malawi’s 
2001/02 food crisis.  In such contexts, they argue for a 
three-step or sequenced approach to food security and 
rural poverty reduction:
ensuring immediate food security requires policies  •
that will work in the absence of effective markets, 
implying a dominant role for social safety nets (where 
the choice between cash and food transfers must be 
based on sound market analysis) and less focus on 
economic growth;
in the medium-term there is a need to develop effec- •
tive markets and rural infrastructure, while maintaining 
social protection measures that are sensitive to local 
market conditions;
in the longer term, once markets and traders are well  •
established and rural infrastructure is in place, then 
market-based policies can be increasingly relied upon 
to promote food security and rural economic 
growth.
The crucial point is that sets of policies must be 
selected that complement each other in achieving short 
and long-term objectives, and they should be adjusted 
over time as circumstances change.  In other words, policy 
synergies between welfare improvements and pro-poor 
agricultural growth must be exploited sensitively 
depending on prevailing conditions and evolving priori-
ties at the time.  Furthermore, policy instruments need 
Table 6. Policy requirements for short and long term achievements of food security, poverty 
reduction and rural economic growth
Requirements for achievement of policy purpose
Policy Goals Short / Medium Term Medium / Long Term 
Food security: Secure & 
affordable access to food
Increased food self-suffi-
ciency (especially for small 
farmers) with food delivery 
and/or productivity 
enhancing safety nets & 
humanitarian response
Increased household & national food market 
access (low & stable cost, secure, timely) 
through wider entitlements with (mainly) 
marketbased safety nets & humanitarian 
response
Poverty reduction: Real 
incomes of the poor increase 
& are more secure, through 
low food costs, higher 
returns to labour, & safety 
nets
Productive safety nets for 
poor farmers (such as input 
subsidies) to increase/ 
secure real incomes & 
develop/ protect assets
Increased agricultural production & diversified 
rural livelihoods; broad-based economic growth 
with opportunities & wages for unskilled rural 
labour, low food prices, & safety net & humani-
tarian response as above
Rural economic growth: 
Increased levels of local 
economic activity, with 
stable income opportunities 
supporting poverty reduc-
tion & food security
Achievement in the short / 
medium term is not 
possible
Macroeconomic stability& low interest rates; 
growth in agricultural & nonagricultural sectors 
tightening labour markets & raising real 
incomes with stable/affordable food prices. 
Development of market economy. Initial growth 
must be achieved without depending on 
(non-existent) markets or firms.
Source: Modified from Dorward and Kydd (2004)
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to complement each other at different stages of market 
development.  Sometimes instruments will need to be 
largely non-market based, but at other times the appro-
priate instruments will be predominantly market based 
(Table 6). 
HGSF procurement models
The closely-related concepts of demand-assisted growth 
and structured demand are operationalised through 
procurement strategy, policy and systems (Box 1).  It 
follows therefore that the objectives and design charac-
teristics of a procurement system will to a considerable 
degree determine the potential of HGSF programmes 
to deliver agricultural development benefits to family 
farmers.  The degree to which this potential is realised 
will ultimately depend on how effectively the particular 
procurement system is implemented.
Producer: someone who farms; a primary producer 
of crops, livestock and/or livestock products
Trader: someone who buys and bulks agricultural 
products from producers and/or in markets, and sells 
them to suppliers and/or caterers or in markets
Supplier: a person or firm that buys agricultural prod-
ucts from producers, traders or through markets, and 
supplies them to schools [thus, a farmers’ association 
should be considered a supplier]
Buyer: someone who has formal responsibility for 
purchasing food from producers, traders, suppliers 
or caters
Caterer: a supplier, or someone who buys from a 
supplier, who then also cooks the food
Transporter: someone who transports food from one 
point to another 
Cook: someone who prepares food
Producer
Cook
School children
Trader
Caterer
Market
Buyer
Buyer
Cook acting
as Buyer
Supplier
Box 1. Main actors and potential 
relationships in HGSF procurement 
system. 
In Figure 5 we outline the logic that would determine 
the shape and functioning of a food procurement system. 
Even if we assume that all procurement systems associ-
ated with HGSF have a dual objective of providing quality 
food at the lowest price and supporting “local” agricul-
tural development, different procurement systems might 
be specified.  Each system will entail trade-offs; and 
depending on the circumstances they might be expected 
to more or less effectively deliver the direct and indirect 
agricultural development benefits discussed 
previously.  
For example, each of the three hypothetical procure-
ment systems sketched out below would have some 
claim to addressing the dual objective, although presum-
ably with different costs and resulting in different levels 
and distributions of agricultural development 
benefits:
A cook, employed by a single school, goes to the  •
nearby market on a weekly basis to purchase maize, 
cowpeas, oil and condiments.  She negotiates with 
different traders in the market to get the best quality—
price combination and pays in cash.
After a public tendering process a school district signs  •
a contract with a nearby farmers association to supply 
a specified quantity of “locally produced” maize and 
cowpeas per month through the school year.  A 
minimum price is set, but the contract specifies that 
if at the time of delivery the “market price” is higher 
the minimum price, the producers association will be 
paid the market price + 10%.  No advance payments 
are given.  The goods are collected by the school district 
every month and delivered to individual schools.  Oil, 
condiments, vegetables and other perishables are 
purchased by the school cook from the local market 
as outlined above.
A national education ministry mandates its procure- •
ment office to publish a call for tenders in the national 
newspaper to supply, distribute and prepare food for 
a national school feeding programme.  The call speci-
fies that a minimum of 50% of all food must be 
produced domestically (within national borders) and 
that a suitable system must be put in place to monitor 
the proportion of domestic produce.  The successful 
bidders must provide indemnity against default, and 
payments are made to the supplier one month in 
arrears.
In order to look further at the question of procurement 
we identified a number of key elements of a procurement 
system.  The question is: how does variation in these 
elements impact on the ability of a procurement system 
to promote agricultural development and deliver bene-
fits to family farmers?  The elements are:
Objective •
Scale [and thus where and how decisions are made,  •
and by who]
Frequency of tendering &/or purchasing events  •
Average s ize  of  lots  purchased;  del iver y  •
requirements
Nature of competition, tendering processes, pricing  •
policy & contracts; payment terms
Restrictions on potential suppliers •
Governance, oversight & financial controls •
The significance of these characteristics is explored 
further in Table, and it should be immediately obvious 
that they are not independent – e.g. the scale of the 
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Figure 5. The logic of a procurement system
Objective(s)
Competences &
capabilities
Scale
Specification of:
    - Products
    - Quantities
    - Procedures
    - Terms
    - Restrictions
Supply options
Strategy
Goods produced
where & by whom
Procurement decisions
taken where & by whom
Table 7. Key dimension of HGSF procurement systems
Characteristic Possibilities / considerations Implications
Objective Primary; Secondary •
Cheap; “Best value” •
Support specific producer group(s) •
Support “local” economy •
The objective – or at least the implementers 
understanding / interpretation of it – may affect 
the ability to use the procurement system to 
achieve rural / social development objectives.
Scale Large (National; Regional) •
Small / Medium, (District;  •
Sub-district)
Micro (School) •
Scale will affect bargaining power (and thus the 
ability to structure demand) & drive frequency 
of purchasing, lot size, restriction of suppliers, 
ability to be opportunistic & feedback 
opportunities
Frequency of 
tendering &/or 
purchasing events
Frequent; Infrequent Linked to scale: impacts on transaction cost; 
may restrict the ability of small scale producers 
& suppliers to supply
Avg. size of lots 
purchased
Large; Small Linked to scale & frequency of tendering: may 
restrict the ability of small scale producers & 
suppliers to supply
Nature of competi-
tion, tendering, 
pricing & contracts
Formal e.g. tendering •
Informal e.g. local market •
Linked to scale: formal tendering may restrict 
the ability of small scale producers & suppliers to 
compete
Local market purchasing may favour small scale 
producers & suppliers
Restrictions on 
potential suppliers
Some; None •
Formal; Informal •
Minimum size •
Legal status •
Location •
Origin of produce •
Potentially linked to scale
May restrict the ability of small scale producers & 
suppliers to compete
But one possible way to achieve rural / social 
development objectives.
Governance, 
oversight & 
financial controls 
Degree of transparency •
Opportunities for rent seeking •
“Local” involvement •
Potentially linked to scale
Potential impacts on efficiency, sustainability, 
commitment etc
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procurement system can be expected to impact on 
frequency of tendering event, the average size of lots 
purchased and so on.
We do not think it is realistic to assume that stimulating 
agricultural development can ever be the primary objec-
tive of a HGSF procurement system.  Rather, the primary 
objectives must be a reliable supply of safe, appropriate 
food at a reasonable cost.  It follows that just because it 
is called HGSF does not mean that schools should be 
willing to pay significantly more for “local” food than for 
“non local” food.  After all, the whole idea is that these 
become “nationally owned” programmes, and the ines-
capable implication is that every extra Cedi, CFA franc, 
Naira or Shilling that is spent as a premium on “local” 
food is one less Cedi, CFA franc, Naira or Kenya that can 
be used to pay for teachers’ salaries, books, school main-
tenance etc.17  This links directly to the lessons highlighted 
by Tendler and Amorim: purchasing units should not be 
required to buy from small firms; products from small 
firms must be delivered at the same price and quality as 
that of the government’s existing suppliers. On the other 
hand, where procurement is directly from producers or 
producers associations and it is not realistic to make 
advance payments as described by Tendler and Amorim, 
a small “premium” over the prevailing market price might 
be justified as it would help ensure that the producers 
fulfil their commitments.
Using information drawn from project documentation 
we have used this same array of characteristics to make 
an initial analysis of HGSF procurement models in Ghana, 
Nigeria and Kenya (Appendix Table 1) and of three styl-
ised food procurement models in Ghana (Table 8).
As might be expected these tables paint an incomplete 
and highly diverse picture.  In these countries the transi-
tion to HGSF is relatively recent and is on-going, and it 
is probably fair to say that appropriate and workable 
procurement systems are not yet fully developed. 
Nevertheless is it interesting to look at these emergent 
procurement systems in the light of the lessons Tendler 
and Amorim drew from the Brazilian experience 
promoting small enterprises through with demand-side 
strategies.  Our analysis is as follows:
Lesson 1: Purchasing units should not be required to  •
buy from small firms. There is no evidence of any such 
requirements although in the Kenya case widowed 
women are identified as a “priority supplier”.
Lesson 2: Support functions must be kept separate  •
from the purchasing function; support agency and 
producers must prove they can delivered at the same 
price and quality as that of the government’s existing 
suppliers. There is no evidence of specific provision of 
supply-side support.
Lesson 3: Procurement should contract only with  •
groups of firms, and pay each producer only upon 
delivery and satisfactory inspection of the product of 
the whole group. There is no specific evidence of 
contracts being made with groups of farmers (e.g. 
through farmers associations).
Lesson 4: Procurement must make a substantial part  •
of the payment to suppliers up front. There is no 
evidence that up-front payments are being made.
Table 8. Characteristics of three stylised HGSF procurement models in Ghana18
Procurement model
Characteristic “School” “Supplier” “Caterer” 
Stated Objective Contribute to poverty 
reduction & food 
security
Reduce hunger &  •
malnutrition
Boost domestic food  •
production
Contribute to poverty 
reduction & food security
- Reduce hunger & 
malnutrition
- Boost domestic food 
production
Contribute to poverty 
reduction & food security
- Reduce hunger & 
malnutrition
- Boost domestic food 
production 
Scale Micro (school, 
community)
Small (sub-district)
Large (national)
Medium (district)
Large (national, regional)
Frequency of 
tendering &/or 
purchasing events
Frequent Infrequent Infrequent 
Avg. size of lots 
purchased
Small Larger than school-based 
model
Larger than school-based 
model
Nature of competi-
tion, tendering & 
pricing
Informal Informal Informal
Restrictions on 
potential suppliers
Apparently none Apparently none Apparently none
Governance, 
oversight & financial 
controls 
Transparency: little •
Local involvement:  •
Strong
Oversight/control:  •
Limited
Transparency: in principle  •
better than with school-
based model
Local involvement: Limited •
Oversight/control: Limited •
Transparency: in principle  •
better than with school-
based model
Local involvement: None •
Oversight/control: Limited •
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Lesson 5: The support agency must earn a small  •
commission on the contract. There is no evidence 
either an identified support agency or specific provi-
sion of supply-side support.
From this necessarily cursory analysis we can say that 
in general HGSF procurement has not taken much 
account of the lessons identified by Tendler and Amorim. 
On the other hand, as indicated above, these are must 
still be seen as emergent procurement systems.  At the 
same time, as we highlight in the next section, there are 
questions as to how relevant the small enterprise experi-
ence is to family farmers in SSA.
Conclusions
Drawing on a wealth of literature and a limited number 
of case studies, this paper has laid out where we believe 
the state-of-the art to be in linking agricultural develop-
ment to school feeding in SSA.  We have specifically 
focused on the “home-grown” part of home grown school 
feeding, in an effort to draw out the general assumptions 
that inform the, often unstated, theory of change.  By 
reviewing the HGSF literature and the main theories 
underpinning it – structured demand, localism, small-
holder farmers – we have exposed areas of inconsistency 
across the literature and programmes as well as possible 
tensions that may arise in attempting to pursue both 
market and social objectives in the same initiative.  In 
laying out this literature we hope to provide a basis for 
moving towards clarity on (1) the concepts and theory 
of change underpinning HGSF programmes; (2) the 
conditions under which HGSF programmes are more able 
to yield positive agricultural development outcomes and; 
(3) an agenda for moving forward on research and impact 
evaluation.  Some areas where we see fertile ground for 
further research are identified below:
Are family farmers analogous to SMEs?
In this paper we have drawn heavily on the work of 
Tendler and Amorim (1996).  While we find their argu-
ments particularly compelling we nevertheless readily 
acknowledge that their work is focused on SMEs as 
opposed to family farms and draws on examples from 
Brazil not SSA.  So, in using Tendler and Amorim’s analysis 
of demand-assisted growth and the lessons they take 
from the Brazilian SME examples, are we drawing from 
the right intellectual and experiential well?
Tendler and Amorim go to great pains to distinguish 
between demand-side and supply-side growth strategies 
and suggest that by- and-large, supply-side strategies 
are not a successful way to promote SME growth. 
Traditional agricultural extension – whether provided 
by the state or NGOs – can be seen as a “supply-side” 
strategy, where the objective is to increase producers’ 
productivity – and thus underpin agricultural growth – by 
introducing e.g. new technology.  The assumption is that 
the market demand which will motivate the investment 
in technical change is either already present or will 
develop in response to the use of productivity enhancing 
technology.  
Over the years there have been many different 
approaches to (a lot of criticism of) agricultural extension 
(a distinctly supply-side approach) in SSA (Rivera 1996; 
Rivera and Sulaiman 2009).  On the other hand, similar 
models have played important parts in rapid agricultural 
change in other parts of the developing world.  Could 
the nature of many agricultural markets in SSA – thin, 
with high levels of coordination risk – help explain these 
differences? 
Possible research questions:
Do family farmers in SSA operate with the same logic  •
as SMEs?   Can the lessons from SME development be 
easily transferred to the small farm sector (see Rogerson 
(2001) and Abor & Quartey (2010)?
Do limited land availability and short-term inelasticity  •
of supply that make demand-side approaches less 
appropriate for family farmers in SSA compared to 
SMEs?
Can we identify equally compelling examples of the  •
successful use of “supply-assisted growth” strategies 
in relation to either SMEs or family farming in SSA that 
would make us think differently about Tendler and 
Amorim’s analysis?
Devolution and structured demand
The notions of “community ownership” and “community 
control” loom large in much that has been written about 
HGSF and in most national HGSF programmes in SSA. 
While mechanisms are seldom made explicit, the argu-
ment seems to be that devolving responsibility to the 
school level, and thus creating a sense of “local” owner-
ship, will help ensure good management and financial 
control, responsiveness to “local” needs and long-term 
sustainability.  It is in this light that some programmes 
put considerable emphasis on the role of e.g. “school 
management committees”.
One result of the strategy of devolution to school-level 
is the decentralised and atomised procurement activities 
than can be seen e.g. in Ghana, where a cook or caterer 
may procure food for an individual school.  This raises 
some important questions, and particularly in relation 
to the ability to effectively structure demand.
We might speculate that demand can only be effec-
tively structured if and when a buyer can exercise a 
significant degree of power in a market.  This power might 
be associated with a number of factors: the scale of 
procurement in relation to the size of the market; the 
offer of premium prices; better payment terms and so 
on.  However, the scale of procurement might be the 
critical factor.  A cook going into a busy market on a daily 
or weekly basis to procure food for a single school (essen-
tially a spot market transaction) would be expected to 
have relatively little power.  On the other hand, someone 
buying food on a much larger scale (e.g. for a number of 
schools and/or for a whole school year) would be in much 
stronger position to set the terms (quality, origin, delivery 
schedule, lot size etc) – in other words, to structure the 
demand.  
If this is correct, than there may be a fundamental 
contradiction at the heart of HGSF: while devolution of 
day-to-day management may be desirable or even neces-
sary in some situations, it may at the same time reduce 
the ability to structure demand, which in turn will break 
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the link between school feeding and agricultural 
development.
Possible research questions:
What are the motivations, benefits and costs of devolu- •
tion of the management of HGSF programmes to 
“local” or school level?
How is ability to structure demand affected by the  •
scale of procurement?  Can demand be structured – 
and the link between school feeding and agricultural 
development maintained – with devolved 
procurement?
Delivery mechanisms for supply-side 
measures
It is clear that there will be few if any agricultural devel-
opment benefits from HGSF if there is no accompanying 
increase in productivity, which in most situations will be 
dependent on improved access to information, training, 
technology, inputs and production credit.  In other words, 
in addition to the whole question of how demand can 
be structured, there are significant coordination and 
delivery challenges that both state-funded agricultural 
extension services and NGOs may struggle to meet.
Possible research questions:
What are the implications of different procurement  •
models and scales of procurement for the effective 
and efficient provision of supply-side measures to 
family farmers?
What does the history and experience of farmers’ asso- •
ciations, cooperatives and other forms of collective 
action in SSA tell us about their role in coordination 
and value as channels for the provision of supply-side 
measures to family farmers? 
Silver bullets on the school menu
It is commonly said that there are no “silver bullets” 
meaning that there are no simple, unproblematic or 
universally applicable answers to the difficult problems 
of (in this case) agricultural development in SSA.  And 
yet, there is always the temptation to oversell a poten-
tially useful idea or model so that it becomes, at least in 
the eyes of some, the only answer.
From a research perspective, acknowledging that 
there are no “silver bullets” is only a first step.  Following 
this is the real challenge – to determine in what situations 
and for what people particular ideas, interventions or 
models are likely to be of value.  This is as true for HGSF 
as for anything else.
Possible research question:
In what situations and contexts, and for what groups  •
of family farmers, is HGSF likely to provide a cost effec-
tive vehicle for livelihood transformation?  
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4 CAADP is NEPAD’s Comprehensive African Agriculture 
Development Programme
(www.nepad-caadp.net/). The programme’s Pillar 3 
(Food supply and hunger) specifically
highlights home-grown school feeding (http://www.
nepad-caadp.net/pillar-3.php).
5 http://www.wfp.org/purchase-progress
6 It is important to note that from an agricultural 
development perspective, HGSF is no
different than if one were to link hospital, army or 
prison feeding, or any other form of “public
food”, to specific agricultural development objectives.
 The literature on agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction is extensive – only a small sample of relatively 
recent work is cited here.
7 The literature on agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction is extensive – only a small sample of relatively 
recent work is cited here.
8  This could also include a group of small farmers 
working together or in cooperative structures.
9 Again, the literature relating to this step is extensive – 
only a small sample is cited here.
10  http://www.caadp.net/pdf/CAADP%20FAFS%20
BROCHURE%20indd.pdf 
11 http://www.gatesfoundation.org/
agriculturaldevelopment/Documents/agricultural-
development-strategy-overview.pdf 
12 There are many claims and counter-claims associated 
with “local” food  e.g. in relation to freshness, flavour, 
health benefits, environmental impacts etc. – see 
Edwards-Jones et al. (2008) for a recent review.  
13  A “thin” market is one in which there are relatively 
few bids to buy and few offers to sell.  Small changes in 
supply or demand can have a dramatic impact on price. 
14  By “additional demand” we mean an increase in 
demand that is potentially satisfied by “local” family 
farmers.  Thus, in the case of an existing school feeding 
programme where all food is presently imported, a shift 
to domestic procurement would be considered 
“additional demand” even though the total food 
consumed does not change.
15  Clearly there could are also benefits to the local 
consumers (children and families) through (1) more 
culturally appropriate foods, and (2) more reliable 
supply.  However, in this paper we are specifically 
interested in the farm producer and supplier side of the 
story.
16  We recognise that by introducing the terms 
“clustered” and “nearby” we run the risk of re-
introducing the same ambiguity that we have argued is 
associated with “local”.  Therefore, by clustered we 
mean that producers are in close enough proximity to 
be able to easily / frequently visit each other, to learn 
from each other, and to have a good understanding of 
each other’s farming operations.  By nearby we mean 
the producers / areas of production are “known” to the 
consumers (i.e. where they are; who they are) and that 
visiting the production area would not be a major 
undertaking.
17  Although one might envisage a situation where any 
premium paid for “local” food is carried by a ministry of 
agriculture or rural development.  Any such 
expenditure could presumably be counted under 
CAADP as agriculture sector investment.
18  Drawing from: Bounstein et al. (2006), GSFP (2006), 
GSFP (2007, 2008, 2009), Aberman (2007), Morgan et al. 
(2007); WFP (2007), Morgan & Sonnino (2008), SNV 
(2008).
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Table 1. Characteristics of procurement systems in pilot countries.
Characteristic Ghana Nigeria Kenya
Objective Development Objective: 
Contribute to Poverty 
Reduction & Food 
Security
Immediate Objectives: 
Boost Domestic Food  •
Production  (GSFP AOP, 
09’)
Stimulate local food  •
production and boost 
income of farmers;
Build and strengthen  •
capacity for effective 
community involvement 
and participation in school 
management;
Stimulate the development  •
of Small and Medium-Scale 
Enterprises (SMEs)
Contribute to reducing the  •
incidence of poverty.
 (National Guideline, 07’) •
To strengthen the capacity of  •
stakeholders at all levels to 
implement school health, nutri-
tion and meals programmes.
To have a framework to regu- •
late, coordinate and ensure 
standards in implementation of 
school health, nutrition and 
meals programmes.
To enhance a comprehensive,  •
effective, efficient and sustain 
able monitoring and evaluation 
system.
(Kenya HGSF ITGM, 09’) •
Scale Sub-district level (USDA, 
Ghana 09’)
 School level Community level
Frequency of 
tendering &/
or purchasing 
events
Fund release is planned 
for every 2 weeks;
Purchasing activities are 
ongoing & at caterers’ 
discretion (GSFP PD, 07’)
Funds are transferred every 2 
weeks;
Cooks purchase food from 
local markets running every 
5 days;
Fund release is bi-annual (Kenya 
HGSF ITGM, 09’)
Nature of 
competition, 
tendering & 
pricing
Tendering process is not 
clear;
No formal selection 
process for caters;
Subsequent procurement 
sources & behaviour are 
unique (USDA, Ghana 09’)
No formal tendering process 
(PCD Nairobi Workshop, 
Nigeria presentation, 10’)
Competitive procurement 
process includes transport of 
food commodities (Kenya HGSF 
ITGM, 09’)
Restrictions 
on potential 
suppliers
Apparently none Food items & materials 
should be obtained by direct 
procurement from the local 
community as much as 
possible (National Guideline, 
07’).
Widowed women identified as 
a priority supplier (Kenya HGSF 
ITGM, 09’) & (USDA, Kenya 09’)
Storage 
capabilities
Storage facilities at school 
level is not considered 
comprehensive enough 
to guarantee safe storage 
of food commodities 
(USDA, Ghana 09’)
Guidelines state that storage 
at schools should meet a 
standard (VDI, Assessment 
09’), however at no point in 
programme literature is the 
that standard defined.  In 
any case, the frequency of 
purchasing probably limits 
the need for storage.
Storage facilities at school level 
are considered comprehensive 
enough to guarantee safely 
storing a three-month supply 
of food commodities in many 
schools (USDA, Ghana 09’)
Governance,  
oversight 
& financial 
controls
Management in hands of  
District Implementation 
Committee (DIC) &  
School Implementation 
Committee (SIC);
Transparency has come 
much into question and it 
has been suggested that 
reporting structures are 
inadequate to safeguard 
against corruption (SNV 
08’)
School-based Management 
Committees have 
management responsibilities 
– including oversight and 
approval of markets (VDI, 
Assessment 09’)
School Management 
Committees are responsible for 
the entire programme (Kenya 
HGSF ITGM, 09’)
Appendix
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